2. The problem with war, said Oliver Wendell Holmes, "is not that it kills men, but that it kills the wrong ones" (cited in Dudziak 1985, 843) . Holmes later confi ded to Harold Laski that "in upholding the constitutionality of a state law upholding for sterilizing imbeciles . . . [I] felt I was getting near to the fi rst principle of real reform" (in Degler 1991, 47) .
the "family wage" (Leonard 2005a) . While progressives did oppose biological defenses of laissez-faire, many also advocated eugenics, the social control of human heredity (Leonard 2005b) . While progressives did advocate for peace, some founded their opposition to war on its putatively dysgenic effects, 2 and others championed American military expansion into Cuba and the Philippines, and the country's entry into the First World War. And, while progressives did seek to check corporate power, many also admired the scientifi cally planned corporation of Frederick Winslow Taylor, even regarding it as an organizational exemplar for their program of reform.
Viewed from today, it is the original progressives' embrace of human hierarchy that seems most objectionable. American Progressive Era eugenics was predicated upon human hierarchy, and the Progressive Era reformers drawn to eugenics believed that some human groups were inferior to others, and that evolutionary science explained and justifi ed their theories of human hierarchy.
But a belief in human hierarchy, while necessary, is not suffi cient for explaining the progressive inclination toward eugenically informed economic reform. The Progressive Era notion that there existed a hierarchy of human groups was shared by many, probably most, of the progressives' contemporaries, including those with opposed views of the proper role for the state in economic affairs. Racism, to pick only the most conspicuous example of human hierarchy, was deeply rooted in the soil of American culture, and its poisonous fruits could be found across the ideological spectrum.
This essay, then, explores the other progressive beliefs that, it argues, are necessary for understanding why the founders of American economic reform appealed to social control of human heredity in making their case for economic reform. In briefest outline, it argues the following: the progressives believed in a powerful, centralized state, conceiving of government as the best means for promoting the social good and rejecting the individualism of (classical) liberalism; the progressives venerated social effi ciency, almost to the point of identifying progress with greater efficiency; the progressives believed in the epistemic and moral authority of science, a belief that comprised their view that biology could explain and control human inheritance and that the still nascent sciences of society could explain and control the causes of economic ills; the progressives believed that intellectuals should guide social and economic progress, a belief erected upon two subsidiary faiths, a faith in the disinterestedness and incorruptibility of the experts who would run the technocracy they envisioned, and a faith that expertise could not only serve the social good, but also identify it; and, while generally antimonopoly, most progressives believed that increasing industrial consolidation was inevitable, and usually desirable, consistent with their faith in planning, organization, and command.
Who Were the Progressives?
Progressive Era historiography employs a sometimes bewildering variety of labels to describe the intellectuals and reformers who promoted the idea of using a powerful, centralized state, led by a vanguard of socialscientifi c experts, to reform markets and society in the name of advancing a social welfarist vision of the common good (Fried 1998, ix) . Some historians refer to the American progressives as "new Liberals," an English import. Early historians of the Progressive Era, such as Richard Hofstadter (1944) , averted to the French "solidarism," and described reform as "meliorism." One also fi nds in Progressive Era historiography "liberal reform," "democratic liberalism," "welfare state liberalism," and "democratic collectivism," among other variants.
The diversity of terminology refl ects the fact that American Progressive Era reformers themselves never shared a common name, which in turn refl ects the great, multifaceted variety of reform projects undertaken in the United States from the late 1880s to the early 1920s. Among the diverse groups that populated Progressive Era reform were nativists, Social Gospelers, alcohol prohibitionists, suffragists, muckrakers, secret balloters, birth controllers, trust busters, eugenicists, social surveyors, charity reformers, settlement house workers, pacifi sts, city-beautiful advocates, factory inspectors, social purifi ers, child-welfare advocates, and conservationists.
The heterogeneity of Progressive Era reform meant that the organizations and constituencies deemed progressive would, at some times, fi nd common cause, and form political alliances. At other times, however, progressive groups regarded their respective reform goals as incompatible. The result was a pattern of cooperation and confl ict that led to shifting political alliances and to a reputation for fractiousness.
3. James Kloppenberg's (1986, 311) gloss of Rodgers's essay on progressivism, published in his infl uential Uncertain Victory, added to Rodgers's three progressive clusters a fourth: "a kind of national purifi cation" movement, encompassing prohibitionists who would purify the nation of liquor, nativists who would purify the nation of undesirable people and politics, and eugenicists who would purify the nation of inferior heredity. Whether one wants to regard "national purifi cation" as part of the progressive language of social effi ciency, as did Rodgers, or as a progressive idea-cluster unto itself, as did Kloppenberg, is more a matter of taxonomy than of substantive disagreement.
Historians of the Progressive Era have, famously, arrived at rather different characterizations of progressivism, depending not merely upon historical approach (intellectual versus social history, say), but also upon which of the many facets of reform they considered. The heterogeneity of historical interpretation has led some historians to despair of identifying a coherent set of ideas that can be gathered under the rubric of "progressivism" (Filene 1970) .
But Progressive Era historiography, for all the diversity it unavoidably refl ects, does evince important narrative commonalities, perhaps no more so than with respect to economic reform. Economic reform, like progressivism more generally, cannot be reduced to a single creed, but it is nonetheless possible to recover a real intellectual coherence in the foundational ideas of the Progressive Era economists we today call progressives. That is the purpose of this essay.
Daniel Rodgers's (1982) infl uential historiographic essay, "In Search of Progressivism," is emblematic in this sense. Careful to acknowledge the heterogeneity of groups deemed progressive by historians, and insisting that progressivism is too plural to be reduced to a single ideology, Rod gers nonetheless fi nds an intellectual structure to progressivism. Rodgers sees in progressivism three identifi able "clusters of ideas," what he also calls "languages of discontent." The three clusters of ideas are (1) the language of social bonds and social duty, accompanied by an attack on individualism; (2) the language of social effi ciency, encapsulated as "effi ciency, rationalization and social engineering" (126); and (3) the language of "antimonopolism," which refers not just to monopoly in the narrow economic sense, but to the long-standing American suspicion of concentrated economic power.
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Each cluster of progressive ideas had distinct historical roots, and each cluster rose into currency and fell into disuse at different times (Rodgers 1982, 123) . Moreover, while American progressive groups all drew upon the three clusters of ideas, they did so in different measures, with sometimes differing interpretations, and for different purposes. This essay con-4. In later years, institutionalist economists such as Wesley Clair Mitchell, Leo Wolman, and Walton Hamilton were members of the AALL General Administrative Council. siders the particular uses of the progressive clusters of ideas made by the progressive economists and their reform allies, especially in the context of the overarching question of the day: What should be the relationship of the state to the economy?
So, who were the progressive economists? A useful synecdoche for progressive economics is the American Association of Labor Legislation (AALL), an organization of reform-minded academics that Ann Shola Orloff and Theda Skocpol (1984, 726) call the "leading association of U.S. social reform advocates in the Progressive Era."
The AALL was founded in December 1905 at the Baltimore American Economic Association (AEA) meetings, by two of Gustav Schmoller's students, Henry Farnam of Yale and Adna F. Weber of the New York Bureau of Labor Statistics (Rodgers 1998, 236) . The fi rst group meeting was in early 1906. Richard T. Ely served as the AALL's fi rst president, and John R. Commons was its fi rst executive secretary. The latter position was soon taken over by Commons's protégé John B. Andrews, who led the organization for many years. Irene Osgood (who became Irene Osgood Andrews), another Commons student, served as the AALL's assistant secretary. Columbia's Henry Rogers Seager, an expert in social insurance, was involved from the very beginning, serving as its third and fi fth president (Commons was the second to hold the AALL presidency). Princeton's William F. Willoughby was the fourth president.
The AALL masthead practically mapped the interlocking directorates of American progressivism. On it were Jane Addams of Hull House; Charles Richmond Henderson, the University of Chicago sociologist and head of Charities and Corrections; Paul Kellogg, editor of the Survey, an infl uential progressive organ; Louis Brandeis, AALL legal counsel until appointed to the Supreme Court by Woodrow Wilson; and Wilson himself, even after he became president of the United States. Importantly, the AALL attracted economists whose politics were not necessarily left of center: Irving Fisher, a political moderate, served as the sixth AALL president, and Frank Taussig, sometimes regarded as politically conservative, lent his name to the AALL masthead for years. 4 Two caveats should be made. First, no single organization, however infl uential, can represent the whole of Progressive Era economic reform. The AALL reformers offer not a defi nition of "progressive," only a useful point of reference. With their hostility to laissez-faire but also their wariness of socialism, their view of the labor question's centrality to political economy, their reformer's desire to set the world to rights, their preference for technocratic over democratic solutions, their veneration of effi ciency, and their abiding faith in social science, statism, and their own disinterested expertise as reliable guides to the social good, the men and women of the AALL provide us with a useful proxy for progressive economics.
Second, the term "progressive" was not, a century ago, a synonym for "on the left politically," and we should avoid the mistake of forcing a one-dimensional left-right mapping upon the progressive economists and their (various) critics. Though many progressive economists resided left of center, no necessarily political position inhered in the use of state power, informed by science and guided by university-trained experts to remedy the ineffi ciency, disorder, and injustice seen to arise from the transformative effects of industrial capitalism. The progressive economists wished to promote social justice, a left goal, but they also were concerned to preserve social order, a quintessentially conservative aim.
The progressivism of Progressive Era economic reform could and did accommodate moderate and conservative statists, such as Theodore Roosevelt, who were prepared to subordinate individual rights to various forms of "national greatness," and who promoted the centralization of government power, in the long-standing Hamiltonian tradition.
Anti-individualism and Nation-Statism
One of the most striking intellectual changes of the American Progressive Era, one with far reaching consequences, was its unprecedented "assault on the idea of individualism itself" (Rodgers 1982, 124) . American economic reformers departed from the deeply rooted Lockean sensibility of their classical liberal forebears, including that of their more proximate ancestors, the Mugwumps, who were also reformers, but stayed within the individualist tradition characteristic of American political culture since its founding.
The progressive economists, like all educated people of their generation, were weaned upon Anglo-American individualism, with its naturalrights-based foundation. But most progressives became nationalists of one sort or another, a rejection of the individualist tradition caused by a powerful confl uence of late-nineteenth-century intellectual infl uences: the German historical school's view that the nation is an organism, something 5. Ely offered a representative Social Gospel view of Christianity. "Christianity, " Ely (1889, 53, 57) asserted, "is primarily concerned with this world," and its purpose is to "bring to pass here a kingdom of righteousness and to rescue from the evil one and redeem all our social relations." greater than the sum of its constituent individuals; the Protestant Social Gospel's move from individual salvation to a collective project of bringing the Kingdom of heaven to earth; 5 the liberating effects of pragmatism, which seemed to license most any departure from previous absolutes, provided such departures proved useful; and the indigenous American tradition of human hierarchy, which posited a hierarchy not of individuals, but of groups, especially races.
Sociologist and reformer Charles Horton Cooley captured the progressives' anti-individualism when he said "the notion of a separate and independent ego is an illusion" (Rodgers 1982, 125) . Richard T. Ely (1886, 49) , fi ring the early shots of his AEA insurgency, proposed that "the nation in its economic life is an organism, in which individuals, families and groups . . . form parts. This is strictly and literally true, as is shown conclusively by comparing the facts of economic life with the ideas embraced in the conception, organism." Thus, proclaimed Ely, progressive economics rejects the "fi ctitious individualistic assumption of the classical political economy" and instead "places society above the individual, because the whole is more than any of its parts" (50, 54).
Washington Gladden, a leading Social Gospeler and ally of Ely's, maintained that "the idea of the liberty of the individual is not a sound basis for a democratic government." The classically liberal emphasis on individual freedom, Gladden argued, was "a radical defect in the thinking of the average American" (in McGerr 2003, 217) . Economist A. B. Wolfe said of his fellow progressives, "We are specifi cally the victims of a social inheritance of political and economic individualism carried over from the eighteenth-century revolt, when the emphasis was on individual rights rather than where it now must be put, upon social function" (Pickens 1967, 80) . AALL stalwart Henry Seager (1910, 5) argued that "the creed of individualism is no longer adequate" and that the "common welfare [requires] . . . an aggressive program of governmental control and regulation."
The progressive rejection of individualism was perhaps best embodied in the Progressive Era's catchphrase, "social control," popularized by Edward A. Ross's Social Control (1901) , a book that was in print until 1932, and sold, Ross boasted, in the hundreds of thousands. "A survey of the foundations of order" (to quote the subtitle of the book), social control, for Ross, did not refer narrowly to state regulation of markets, but described a broader "system of control, [which] , like the educational system, is charged . . . with the shaping of individuals" (Ross 1896, 521) . Individuals were but "plastic lumps of human dough," Ross (1901, 168 ) maintained, to be formed on the great "social kneading board."
The new collectivism of the economic reformers was much more Bismarckian than Marxian. The "German model" that the American economists had admired as graduate students in the late 1870s and 1880s featured a top-down welfare state advised by expert professors who took the nation as their explanatory unit of account. Most progressive economic reformers, that is, were statists (or nationalists) but not socialists. The non-Marxian aspect of the "German economics" behind American progressivism survived its transplantation to American soil: few American reformers seriously embraced extensive state ownership of the instruments of production, the heart of programmatic Continental socialism.
The American reformers also followed their German professors in assigning the nation or state special priority. Ely, like many progressives with German training, conceived of the state not as the agent of society, but as coextensive with society itself. Ely referred to the state as the "great cooperative society." And, as an evangelical, Ely also assigned it divine import. "God works through the State in carrying out His purposes more universally," Ely (1896, 162-63) said, "than through any other institution."
Lester Frank Ward subtitled his 1906 treatise, Applied Sociology, On the Conscious Improvement of Society by Society. Ward coined the term sociocracy to describe his vision of social improvement, the "scientifi c control of social forces by the collective mind of society" (Fine 1956, 263) . The terms for the group varied, but progressives systematically rejected the liberal idea that the individual is prior to the group. "Whether 'state,' or 'nation,' or 'society,'" Henry Carter Adams (1886, 16) wrote, "the fundamental thought is the same. The thing itself brought into view is an organic growth and not a mechanical arrangement."
It was Ward who pioneered the American progressive emphasis on the nation as the rightful unit of theoretical account. So, when the New Republic's Walter Lippmann (1914, 266) wrote in Drift and Mastery that "men have to substitute purpose for tradition," an idea he called "the profound-6. "We can no longer treat life as something that has trickled down to us," Lippmann continued; "we have to deal with it deliberately, devise its social organization, alter its tools, formulate its method, educate and control it. In endless ways we put intention where custom has reigned. We break up routines, make decisions, choose our ends, select means" (267).
7. As Rodgers (1982, 124) points out, "Much of the thrust of academic social thought in the nineteenth century had, in fact, consisted of a fi ner and fi ner elaboration of what the term 'society' meant." est change that has ever taken place in human history," Lippmann spoke not of individual purpose, but of social purpose. 6 Progressivism required more than purpose, for the traditional American emphasis upon individual self-help was nothing if not purposeful. Progressivism's social control was premised upon a view that society should be planned in the name of a social collective, where the collective had interests greater than the sum of the interests of its individual members. "Purposeful activity must henceforth be recognized as a proper function not only of the individual," read Richard Hofstadter's (1944, 64) gloss on Ward, "but of the whole society." Refl ecting upon the Progressive Era, John R. Commons (1934, 874) characterized his progressivism this way: "a theory of social progress by means of personality controlled, liberated, and expanded by collective action. It is not individualism, it is institutionalized personality."
Not all progressives idealized the nation-state as much as did Ely, Ward, Ross, and others, such as Herbert Croly and Theodore Roosevelt, for whom "the lines of social connection always ran toward the nation, the state." Some progressives, epitomized by Hull House social worker Jane Addams, spoke more of "the bonds of family, community and neighborhood" (Rodgers 1982, 125) . Whether it imagined community as local or national in nature, the "rhetoric of social cohesion" was not new in the Progressive Era.
7 What was new, more than an emphasis on social bonds as such, was the rejection of individualism and the classical liberal tradition, which economic reformers disparaged as "laissez-faire," "do-nothingism," and "English political economy."
There was, in particular, a newfound willingness to subordinate individual rights, previously inviolate, to the interests of the social whole, however that whole's scope was defi ned. By the time of the First World War, the editors of the progressive New Republic regarded the Bill of Rights as quaint and even retrograde: "What inalienable right has [the individual]," they asked rhetorically, "against the community that made him and supports him" ("Bill of Rights" 1915, 273) . The answer was, 8 . The troublesome language resides in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which require that the states not restrict life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The Lochner Court read "liberty" as including liberty of contract. The phrase "liberty of contract" nowhere appears in the Constitution, but neither does "police power," the foundation of the progressives' legal case for regulating wages, hours, and working conditions. The police power refers to the power of the several states to enact laws that override constitutional rights to liberty and property, in the name of a compelling public interest in health, welfare, or morals. "none." Progressives fi rmly and almost universally rejected the naturalrights-based discourse of classical liberalism, in law, in politics and in economics.
Of course, constitutional impediments to one side, the problem remained of how exactly Ward's "collective mind of society" would manage to scientifi cally control society. The reform economists' vague language of cooperation and Christian brotherhood, characteristic of the late 1870s and 1880s, gave way during the 1890s to a more concrete embrace of state compulsion. By the 1890s, social control, in practice, meant state control. Most progressives involved in economic reform, including those like Florence Kelley, who originally preferred voluntary cooperation and moral suasion to legislation, came around to the idea that state compulsion was the best vehicle for promoting their vision of the collective good.
In Progressive Era parlance, the term socialism was sometimes used to characterize the anti-individualism of American reform. But, among economic reformers, socialism used this way referred less to state ownership of capital, than to a view of the proper relationship between the individual and society, broadly defi ned. As Robert Lee Hale put it, in a letter rebutting Thomas N. Carver's charge of socialism, "The only sense of the word in which I am conscious of being a 'socialist' is in the sense of not being an individualist" (in Fried 1998, 233 n. 34). Ely (1911, 366) , in an AEA panel on the meaning of socialism, likewise referred to this meaning of socialism as the "social philosophy which is opposed to individualism." A socialist in American progressive parlance was a person who acted with the social whole in mind, and believed that others should too.
So while most American progressives were "socialists" in the restricted sense of being anti-individualist, few were prepared to endorse a program that would abolish private property. Progressives were happy to restrict individual property rights; indeed their legislative reforms famously required circumventing the U.S. Constitution's protection of "life, liberty and property."
8 And some argued that certain industries, such as natural monopolies, should be publicly owned and operated, so-called gas and water socialism. But, among reform economists, the progressive case for public ownership of industry was circumscribed, and it was, moreover, most often founded on grounds of scale effi ciency, not on grounds of distributive justice or of plutocracy. Henry Carter Adams's (1887) infl uential monograph, The Relation of the State to Industrial Action, advocated state intervention only in those industries characterized by continuously increasing returns to scale, such as utilities, where entry by more than one fi rm would be economically ineffi cient, that is, would raise average costs. Adams's case carefully argued against state involvement in most manufacturing, where, he argued, returns were constant, and in agriculture, where returns were decreasing.
The progressives' failure to attack private property more systematically has led some Left historians, such as Gabriel Kolko (1963) and James Weinstein (1968) , to condemn the American progressives as "conservative." By "conservative," the Left historians mean insuffi ciently radical or nonsocialist. But "conservative" does not exhaust the very large category of nonsocialist. So while I agree that the progressives were conservative, I use "conservative" to refer to something closer to Robert Wiebe's (1967) meaning: the progressives' impulse to impose order upon what they saw as the economic disorder caused by the rise of American industrial capitalism and its concomitants.
Taylor's Scientifi c Management and the Progressives' Cult of Effi ciency
Scientifi c management, or "Taylorism," is today a term of abuse, especially on the left. "Taylorism" is associated with dehumanizing work practices, and the deskilling of labor. But this contemporary characterization is remote from how the original progressives regarded scientifi c management.
In fact, Frederick Winslow Taylor's program appealed to many American progressives. Taylor's biographer, Daniel Nelson, judges Taylor's The Principles of Scientifi c Management (1911) "above all a reform tract, a progressive manifesto" (cited in Kanigel 1997, 504) . For leading Progressive Era reformers, the scientifi cally managed fi rm offered both a method for overcoming destructive competition in industry-planning-and also 9. After Taylor's death in 1915, Commons gradually turned against scientifi c management, albeit on unusual grounds. Commons believed that Taylor's vision of unions (through their expert representatives) participating in fi rm planning was tantamount to making labor share the risks of the corporate enterprise, when, Commons argued, labor should not be made to share such risks. See Nyland 1996. a model for making other forms of organization more effi cient, government especially.
Taylor's great champion was Louis Brandeis, who called Taylor a genius and made Taylor's reputation when he used scientifi c management theory to criticize the railroads in the Eastern Rate case of 1910. Brandeis, who represented the shippers opposed to the rate increase the eastern railroads sought from the Interstate Commerce Commission, invoked Taylor to argue that railroads would not need higher rates if only they would manage their costs more effi ciently, using the principles of scientifi c management. "The coming science of management in this century," Brandeis declared, "marks an advance comparable only to that made by the coming of the machine in the last" (cited in Kanigel 1997, 504) .
Walter Lippmann, for his part, believed that scientifi c management would "humanize work" (Haber 1964, 94) . John R. Commons called scientifi c management "the most productive invention in the history of modern industry" (Haber 1964, 148) . 9 Muckraker Ida Tarbell called Taylor a creative genius, and gushed that "no man in history has made a larger contribution to . . . genuine cooperation and juster human relations" (Kanigel 1997, 104-5) . Another notable muckraker, Ray Stannard Baker, wrote a glowing profi le of Taylor in the American Magazine (1911) .
Florence Kelley, the great labor reformer, joined the Taylor Society, which, during the 1920s, served as refuge for future New Dealers, such as Rexford Tugwell and John Maurice Clark. Taylor's condescension to unscientifi c management, and the emphasis Taylor's system placed upon the technological aspects of production over the fi nancial side of business, eventually won over Thorstein Veblen, an early skeptic. Lenin was drawn to Taylor's emphasis on increasing production above all else (Haber 1964, 150-52) , and later made Taylor's methods part of Soviet production theory.
Taylor's vision offered Progressive Era reformers an almost irresistible package: greater effi ciency, order, and fairness, all realized via the expert application of science. Taylor promised greater effi ciency, to be sure. But he also promised greater order and fairness in the workplace. A properly scientifi c approach to management, Taylor argued, one which brought system and scientifi c rigor to the heretofore pre-scientifi c and disorderly enterprise of business management, would not only increase productivity, it would also promote industrial peace and fairness. As Samuel Haber (1964, x) , the leading scholar of Taylor and progressivism, put it, greater "effi ciency meant social harmony."
Taylor offered progressives fairness as both input and output of scientifi c management. Scientifi c management represented itself as the product of science-the application of engineering methods to business management. Rather than follow rules of thumb, the engineer would, via observation and experiment, methodically determine optimal work techniques, scientifi cally discovering the "one best rule." That the engineering science in scientifi c management was more practical than theoretical in emphasis only heightened its appeal to economic reformers.
The progressives, who placed great store in the epistemic virtues of scientifi c inquiry, also saw science as conferring impartiality. Scientifi c truths might be hard truths, but there was no gainsaying them. As the product of a selfl ess search for truth, not for power or advantage, scientifi c outcomes, unlike the outcomes of politics or markets, were impartial.
Scientifi c management also promised to promote fairness. When Taylor proposed to substitute central planning for what he saw as the arbitrary power of bosses (shop foremen), progressives saw this as increasing not only effi ciency, but also fairness. Scientifi c management promised to substitute the "leadership of the competent" for the leadership of the bosses (Haber 1964, x) . The New Republic's Herbert Croly imagined that scientifi c management would replace "robber barons" with "industrial statesman," a term that captures the progressive faith in technocratic rule, while also revealing something of what economic reformers meant by "industrial democracy." "In the past," said Taylor (1911, 7) , "the man has been fi rst, in the future, the system must be fi rst."
Of course, claims to fairness notwithstanding, Frederick Taylor, like all planners, was not eliminating authority. He was merely relocating it, by fl attening the fi rm's organizational hierarchy, and placing real authority, especially the authority to hire and fi re, with the planning department. Taylor did indeed reduce the power of the shop foremen, but he did so by giving it to the effi ciency experts (Haber 1964, 25) .
Greater cooperation between labor and capital Taylor promised via two channels: one, better work techniques and increased supervision of worker effort, and, two, the consequence of greater output to be divided among the claimants to its value. The former ultimately proved to be the undoing of Taylorism. Most workers did not passively accept greater monitoring of their work effort. Nor did workers gratefully receive the tuition of effi ciency experts, with its assumption that, as one reviewer of Taylor put it, "the best method is the one the individual laborer cannot discover for himself, and hence it is the function of management to discover and apply it" (Jones 1911, 834) . The notion that less autonomy and more supervision would be welcomed by workers if only the new authorities were planners rather than foremen, tells of the naïve, elitist prejudices of Taylor and his admirers.
Finally, the output-increasing advantages of scientifi c management held out the alluring prospect of reducing labor-management confl ict. Greater production would make it possible for "both sides [to] take their eyes off the division of the surplus until this surplus becomes so large that it is unnecessary to quarrel over how it shall be divided" (Haber 1964, 27) . However exaggerated, this was a tantalizing prospect in an era beset by labor strife. Taylor, like the economic reformers, took the labor question as primary. He believed that both workers and management wrongly regarded labor confl ict as endemic to economic life, when, in fact, its true cause was ineffi ciency. Once shown that they shared the common enemy of ineffi ciency, workers and management, Taylor believed, would be induced to work cooperatively.
Greater effi ciency, for many progressives, essentially defi ned progress. By effi ciency, progressives meant productive effi ciency. When Taylor referred to the "engineer as economist," he did not mean that engineers should become political economists, but that they should reduce waste and promote more output from a given quantity of inputs.
Progressives enthusiastically and rapidly seized upon industrial efficiency as an exemplar, imagining that scientifi c planning could promote effi ciency in society more generally. Following Brandeis's intervention on behalf of Taylor, a fl ood of volumes on effi ciency appeared, preaching greater effi ciency not just in industry and in government, but also in education, in medicine, in the home, and in human beings themselves.
Joseph Mayer Rice's 1913 bestseller, Scientifi c Management in Education, reported on the results of the new educational testing. Irving Fisher (1909, 15) promoted "biological engineering," by which he meant the study and improvement of human effi ciency. Ellen Swallow Richards (1910, 152-53) , founder of home economics, advocated greater effi ciency in the home. Richards proposed that "the work of home-making in this engineering age must be worked out on engineering principles, and with 10. See Bradley Bateman's (2001) fi ne essay on the connections between the Social Gospel, the reform empiricism of the social survey movement, and the effi ciency vogue.
11. For a view of the Progressive Era conservation movement as a quintessentially progressive movement, motivated by a small cadre of experts and aimed at a more orderly and effi cient use of natural resources, see Hays 1959. the cooperation of both trained men and women." Sociologist and minister Samuel Dike (1912) proposed that even religious practices should be made more efficient. 10 The times, argued Charles Horton Cooley, demanded nothing less than a "a comprehensive 'scientifi c management' of mankind, to the end of better personal opportunity and social function in every possible line" (in Quandt 1970, 139) .
Conservation was a cognate term for effi ciency. In the Progressive Era, conservation referred not just to natural resources such as land, but to social and human resources as well. "The problem of conserving natural resources," Irving Fisher (1909, 1) argued in his National Vitality, "is only one part of the larger problem of social effi ciency." The AALL's motto was "Conserving Human Resources." Madison Grant, author of The Passing of the Great Race, is today remembered as a reactionary scientifi c racist, but he was also a leading nature conservationist. Grant regarded the despoliation of western lands and the despoliation of the Anglo-Saxon race as like problems demanding a like solution, the imposition of expert stewardship.
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Effi ciency demanded measurement, which had the virtue of lending precision (real or imagined) and scientifi c authority. As Rodgers (1982, 126) puts it, "The language of social effi ciency offered a way of putting the Progressives' common sense of social disorder into words and remedies free of the embarrassing pieties and philosophical conundrums that hovered around the competing languages of social bonds." Introducing Charles McCarthy's The Wisconsin Idea, Theodore Roosevelt (1912) quoted progressive economist Simon Patten, who argued that "without measures of result an ideal becomes meaningless. "The real idealist," quoted Roosevelt, "is a pragmatist and an economist. He demands measurable results. . . . [For] only in this way is social progress possible."
Progressive social scientists, notably the founders of the AEA and the AALL, pointedly distinguished the empirical orientation of their reform economics from the more abstract, deductive approach of late classical political economy (Barber 1987) . "Look and see," preached Richard T. Ely, aphorizing one of his AEA founding statements of principle: "We look not so much to speculation as to historical and statistical study of actual conditions of economic life" (Seligman 1925, 148) . Measurement and an empirical approach to political economy were what, in the minds of the progressives, made their reform economics more scientifi c. Said Lester Ward (1915, 46) , refl ecting the aspirations of many progressives, "If laws of social events could be statistically formulated, they could be used for scientifi c lawmaking." Efficiency experts measured not only the productivity of factory fl oors, public schools, households, and immigrant neighborhoods, they also measured human bodies, human character, and human intelligence. Goddard (1920, 35-36) who initiated intelligence testing of immigrants at Ellis Island, fi nding 80 percent "feeble-minded," and who, with Robert Yerkes, tested U.S. Army draftees for World War I, fi nding that 70 percent possessed a mental age of twelve or less.
Before eugenicists dreamed of measuring intelligence, a complex trait, they measured human heads. At the turn of the century, Veblen's Journal of Political Economy published an extraordinary outpouring of articles by economist Carlos Closson, who popularized and proselytized for the scientifi c racism of two leading physical anthropologists, Georges Vacher de LaPouge and Otto Ammon (e.g., de LaPouge and Closson 1897). The anthropologists measured thousands of human heads, calculating the cephalic index, or ratio of head width to head length, which they believed demonstrated a permanent race hierarchy. The measuring of heads, they said, was "destined to revolutionize the political and social sciences as radically as bacteriology has revolutionized the sciences of medicine" (1897, 54). Veblen selected de LaPouge and Closson's boast to introduce his infl uential critique of neoclassical political economy, "Why Is Economics Not an Evolutionary Science?" (1898).
Technocracy: Government by Expert
Economic reformers were both partisans of effi ciency and partisans of the state. They imagined that the improvement of society, economy, and humanity would be designed and superintended by government experts. Just as the effi ciency experts in the scientifi cally managed fi rm's planning department brought order to the unplanned chaos of the shop fl oor, so too would government effi ciency experts bring order to the unplanned chaos of industrial capitalism.
But the progressives' impulse to use government to set the world to rights was tempered by their judgment that American government, and its party system, was, at all levels, badly in need of reform. Corrupt and decentralized, American government was, at once, the "locus of progressives' hopes, and also the source of their unease" (Rodgers 1982, 125) .
The disparity between the government progressives imagined and the government they observed did not induce them to scale back their project of reform. Instead, they expanded it, to include government as well. Progressives at the forefront of economic reform imagined a kind of technocracy, where government experts could administrate, free (or at least insulated) from the partisanship and corruption they saw in American politics. In its more undemocratic versions, progressivism sought to subordinate politics to expert administration altogether (Haber 1964, 104) .
Before the state could order the chaos of the competitive marketplace, it would be necessary to bring order to the state itself-that is, to control (or at least circumvent) the political bosses and their corrupt political machines with expert administrators and a professional civil service. As one widely read eugenics text put it, "Government and social control are in the hands of expert politicians who have power, instead of expert technologists who have wisdom. There should be technologists in control of every fi eld of human need and desire" (Albert Wiggam's New Decalogue [1923] , cited in Ludmerer 1972, 16-17) . Ely (1898, 781) believed that reform required "leadership and guidance from superior classes." When Edward A. Ross famously described progressivism as "intelligent social engineering," he was invoking the technocratic ideal of the government expert qua engineer. The social engineer resides above politics, concerned only to repair the broken mechanisms of society and economy (Ross 1907, 41) . The case for technocratic governance was put baldly by Irving Fisher (1907, 20) , when he said, "The world consists of two classes-the educated and the ignorant-and it is essential for progress that the former should be allowed to dominate the latter. . . . Once we admit that it is proper for the instructed classes to give tuition to the uninstructed, we begin to see an almost boundless vista for possible human betterment." E. R. A. Seligman was more cautious regarding the limits of scientifi c knowledge applied by government experts, but he acknowledged the necessary tension between technocracy and democracy, recognizing that, in the progressive view, the expert was to the state as the priest was to the 12. As quoted in Haskell [1977] 2000, 179. 13. For a history of Wisconsin institutionalism, which emphasizes the infl uence of Commons, see Rutherford 2006. church. "The scholar," said Seligman, "must possess priestly qualities and fulfi ll priestly functions, including political activity. His knowledge, as Fiche says, 'should be truly applied for society's use; he should get people to feel their true needs and acquaint them with the means of their satisfaction'" (in Fink 1998, 14) .
The faith that expert social science could not only guide markets toward the social good, but could also identify the social good, ran deep in reform political economy. Franklin Sanborn, the director of the social economy department of the American Social Science Association, an AEA precursor, had put it this way in 1886: "To learn patiently what is-to promote diligently what should be,-this is the double duty of all the social sciences, of which political economy is one" (6).
12 Both organizations embraced the reform impulse, but the ASSA (founded in 1865) was constituted by amateurs, and the AEA (founded in 1885) was founded by academics (and evangelicals) aiming to professionalize economics. The change in the status of economists-from amateurs to professionals, from public intellectuals to scientifi c experts-coincided with and refl ected a change in how economic reform was to be carried out. In particular, the professionals (actual and aspiring) who founded the AEA assigned the leading role to the state, which, in its turn, created new occupational roles for the reforming economist: that of expert policy counselor and that of expert government servant. The technocracy would need to be staffed.
Economic Expertise in Practice
In practice, the earliest realized exemplar of the progressives' technocratic vision was the Wisconsin Idea. In Wisconsin, professorial experts joined hands with enlightened politicians to investigate economic and social problems, and then to devise reforms. John R. Commons, who, along with Edward A. Ross, had been recruited by Richard T. Ely to Wisconsin, probably traveled the main street that connected the university with the state capitol more frequently than any other faculty member. But the entire Wisconsin economics faculty, and many other scholars, were actively involved in expert government investigation and reform. By 1908, fully one-sixth of the University of Wisconsin faculty held appointments on Wisconsin government commissions (Fogel 2000) .
13
The Wisconsin Idea, with its intimate connection between government, social-scientifi c expertise, and empirical investigation, was imitated by other states and by the federal government. James T. Kloppenberg (1986, 209) characterizes the Wisconsin Idea as a "prototype of national progressivism."
The advent of economic expertise in the service of reform changed not just American government, but also American economics. Prior to the Progressive Era, American political economists addressed economic issues, but they ordinarily wrote as public intellectuals, for an educated lay audience, publishing in general interest journals such as the Nation, or the Atlantic, or in the religious press. As economics professionalized, it gradually institutionalized in American universities, and political economists increasingly wrote as technical experts, publishing in the research universities' new scholarly journals, and establishing the scientifi c bona fi des demanded by government, whose investigators and policy makers were themselves developing new roles exercising their powers to investigate and regulate market relationships.
Beginning with the Progressive Era, then, the locus of economic knowledge production changed. It moved into the universities, and, as the demand for specialized economic information arose, also into the new government statistical agencies. "The welfare state," historian of statistics Theodore Porter (2003, 39) summarizes, "evolved in conjunction with new kinds of data and new forms of social science."
Progressive Era economists' most enduring policy infl uence came through two related institutions: the expert-led commission, and the government statistical agencies, especially the U.S. and state bureaus of labor statistics (Furner 1990) . As Robert Fogel (2000) Taylor (1911, 7) , recall, whose scientifi c-management manifesto insisted that "the system must be fi rst." ended the era of open immigration and imposed eugenically motivated racial quotas upon immigrants from southern and eastern Europe. As commissions begat new government agencies the line between economist as expert and economist as policy maker began to blur, as exemplifi ed by Frank Taussig's appointment (by Woodrow Wilson) to be the fi rst chair of the U.S. Permanent Tariff Commission (Church 1974) .
Even those commissions that did not, of themselves, beget new government agencies, such as the Industrial Relations Commission (IRC) of 1912 (operating 1913-16), were infl uential, and promoted the model of economists as experts. The IRC, which employed W. Jett Lauck (of Chicago), Sumner Schlicter (of Cornell and Harvard), and Leo Wolman (of Columbia), produced an extraordinarily large set of volumes on family budgets, labor relations, and labor unions, and persuaded many states to adopt minimum-wage, maximum-hour, and working-conditions legislation.
The Consolidated Firm versus "the Planless Scramble of Little Profi teers"
The Progressive Era vogue for effi ciency, "the merger of the prestige of science with the prestige of the well-organized business fi rm," Rogers (1982, 126) argues, gave the "metaphor of system its tremendous twentiethcentury potency." 14 But Rogers fi nds an incongruity in progressive thought, in the form of progressives who "slide back and forth between criticism of business-made chaos and schemes to reorganize government along business lines" (126). This reading, I believe, confl ates the fi rm with the market.
The economic progressives drawn to scientifi c management were consistent: they celebrated the scientifi cally managed fi rm as orderly and efficient, indeed regarded it as an organizational model for centralizing and streamlining government along more technocratic lines. The properly managed fi rm was an organization, the operation of which called for system and for command, and with them the scientifi c, bureaucratic, and hierarchical values the economic reformers embraced. A competitive market is not an organization, systematic or other. A competitive market is characterized by voluntary exchange, not command: its decisions are decentralized and its outcomes are unplanned. 15. Wesley Clair Mitchell (1927, 172) , in the revision of his 1913 Business Cycles, distinguished "coordination of effort within each business enterprise" from the "planlessness" of "coordination of effort among independent enterprises." "Coordination within an enterprise is the result of careful planning by experts," said Mitchell, while "coordination among independent enterprises . . . is the unplanned result of natural selection in a struggle for business survival." Because of these and other factors, Mitchell said, "coordination within an enterprise is characterized by economy of effort; coordination among independent enterprises by waste." Thus is "the growth in the size of the business enterprise a gain, because it increases the portion of the fi eld in which close coordination of effort is feasible." I thank an anonymous referee for pointing me to this passage.
16. Thus could competition, in the sense of free markets, be characterized as producing less competition, in the sense of a market structure giving rise to prices above marginal costs.
17. Dennis Robertson (1923, 85 ) memorably described fi rms as "islands of conscious power in this ocean of unconscious cooperation, like lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of buttermilk."
The idea of a benefi cial spontaneous order arising from voluntary market exchange was dismissed by economic progressives as so much laissez-faire dogma, a doctrine perhaps suitable for Adam Smith's day, but not for the new era of industrial capitalism, with its trusts, pools, and large labor unions. The Progressive Era consolidation of capital and labor, in the progressive view, made Adam Smith's system of natural liberty obsolete.
15
Many economic reformers used the term competition to refer broadly to a free market system-as in, "the competitive system"-as distinct from the later, neoclassical sense of "competition," which referred to the particular market structure that gives rise to marginal-cost pricing. 16 The terminological confusion matters because economic progressives were, famously, hostile to a free market system (and thus to "competition"), and the disorder, ineffi ciency, and unfairness seen to attend it. But they were not, thereby, opposed to the consolidated forms of economic organization that were produced by free markets. To the contrary, progressive economists generally regarded the new behemoths favorably, as "islands of conscious power," organizations that, unlike the small producers and farmers of the mid-nineteenth century, were purposeful, rational, and effi cient.
17
Progressive economists, like many others, were greatly impressed by the extraordinary Progressive Era consolidation of businesses into trusts and combinations from 1895 to 1904 (Lamoreaux 1985) . Most progressive economists regarded large fi rms as a permanent feature of the new economic landscape. "It is useless to abuse and attack the trusts," said John R. Commons; we should confi ne ourselves "to discussing the trusts 18. William F. Willoughby (1898, 89) said, "The environment under which the laborers carry on their work, is far superior in the larger establishments." from the viewpoint of inevitability" ("Albert Shaw" 1899). "The true line of policy," said William F. Willoughby (1898, 94) , also a future AALL president, "is to recognize that consolidation of industrial enterprises is inevitable."
In fact, most economic reformers regarded industrial consolidation as not only inevitable, but also as desirable, provided government could ensure against monopoly. In particular, operating on a large scale provided greater cost effi ciency in production; large fi rms eliminated wasteful "higgling of the market," offered employees better working conditions, and were more likely to be run by professional management. 18 The progressive economists were thus opposed to monopoly but not to bigness as such, and, because of this, were not "antimonopoly" in the populist, small-producer sense of the term.
Indeed, the 1895-1904 decade of industrial consolidation goes some way to explaining the puzzle of why, in 1905, William A. White could say that "it is funny how we have all found the octopus," when, as Rodgers (1982, 124) puts it, "less than a decade earlier . . . his like had denied that animal's very existence." The consolidated industrial fi rm "discovered" by progressive economists circa 1905 was, in fact, a different beast than the one already conjured by the western, agrarian populism best represented by William Jennings Bryan. The Bryanite populists' antimonopolism, which continued an American political tradition dating to Andrew Jackson, opposed consolidated power, especially Eastern money and banking, and it opposed it more for its perceived threats to small producers and to democracy than for any adverse effects upon consumers from monopoly pricing power. Progressive economists were no friends of economic populism and its defense of what they saw as ineffi cient and outmoded small producers and farmers.
That said, nearly all progressives agreed that monopoly should be policed: a larger state role was seen as irresistible. On the question of the trusts, all three presidential candidates in the 1912 election offered impeccable reform credentials: the Republican Taft administration had broken up Standard Oil and American Tobacco, indeed had initiated more antitrust proceedings than had Theodore Roosevelt, the "trustbuster" who was in 1912 heading the Progressive Party ticket. Woodrow Wilson, the Democratic Party nominee, was vigorously antitrust.
19. As long as the new behemoths were disciplined to price competitively by the threat of potential competitors, Clark's (1897, 600) policy recommendation was "hands off . . . competition," a regulatory approach he called "a new and higher type of laissez-faire." There were differences among progressives concerning trust policy. John Bates Clark, the pioneering neoclassical economist, believed that the continuing threat of entry to single-fi rm incumbents-what he called potential competition-was ordinarily suffi cient to discipline incumbents to price at or near competitive levels. Clark was neoclassical in his emphasis upon competitive price as the normative desideratum, and in limiting government's role to policing departures from competitive pricing, rather than relying upon imperfect proxies for monopoly pricing power, such as scale or market concentration (Leonard 2003a). 19 At the other end of the policy spectrum lay Thorstein Veblen's notquite-socialist vision. Veblen (1921) , emboldened by the economic planning undertaken in the American mobilization for World War I, conceived of the U.S. economy as a single, giant fi rm. It would be governed by a soviet of central-planning engineers-not state ownership exactly, but a kind of planners' trusteeship. Veblen was, as ever, extreme, both in the scope of industrial consolidation he imagined, and in his vision of professional engineers as the agents of radical social transformation. But Veblen's view of the inevitability of large-scale enterprise, his conception of engineering as the disciplinary instantiation of an impartial, scientifi c means to greater effi ciency, and his enthusiasm for economic planning on the model of business planning (rightly conceived), were widely shared among progressives. If few extrapolated the consolidation trend as did Veblen, most progressives imagined that larger business enterprises would continue to displace small-scale enterprise.
The leading strand of progressive antitrust thought, represented by Theodore Roosevelt, argued that big business should be countervailed by big government, but not dismantled. Roosevelt's "new nationalism" imagined the federal government as a powerful, neutral defender of the public interest in securing the lower production costs provided by large scale, with regulation to ensure that the trusts did not abuse monopoly pricing power or unduly infl uence democratic decision making.
Breaking up the big fi rms was seen by Rooseveltian progressives as not only impractical, but also as destructive of effi ciency and the other virtues of large scale. Ely (1900, 213) said, for example, "when [trusts] come about as the result of a free development, they are a good thing, and it is a bad thing to break them up; from efforts of this kind, no good has come to 20. See Adelstein 1989 for an interesting argument that Brandeis's contradictions made him more a Leninist than a Jeffersonian. "In the Zion of [Brandeis's] imagination," writes Adelstein, "every citizen would instinctively regard the common good, and cheerfully accept the direction of superiors to do his or her part in realizing it. The needs of the whole would dominate the desires of the self in every free man and woman; and the will to cooperate would replace the urge to compete" (620).
the American people." Said Walter Lippmann (1914, 124) in Drift and Mastery:
If the anti-trust people . . . [did] what they propose, they would be engaged in one of the most destructive agitations that America has known. They would be breaking up the beginning of collective organization, thwarting the possibility of cooperation, and insisting upon submitting industry to the wasteful, the planless scramble of little profi teers.
Louis Brandeis represented the minority position Lippmann assailed, but he had an infl uential client in Woodrow Wilson. Brandeis believed that antitrust law should break up the new behemoths. Brandeis was skeptical about the lower costs said to obtain with large scale, and he worried that the Rooseveltian approach might lead to regulatory capture. Leaving the behemoths intact, said Brandeis, could enable rather than impede a plutocratic seizure of the levers of democracy.
Brandeis was an outlier among economic reformers in this regard, a sophisticate with populist ideas. Brandeis disliked what he called the "curse of bigness," in big business but also in big government. Brandeis (1934) , in short, was a Jeffersonian, skeptical that Jeffersonian ends, in particular the decentralization of political power, could ever safely be entrusted to the Hamiltonian means of Roosevelt and the other economic progressives who, in his view, uncritically placed their faith in the virtue and effi cacy of big government. 20 Brandeis's skepticism that Hamiltonian means could serve Jeffersonian ends was rare among economic progressives. Most progressives were, like Herbert Croly, confi dent that Hamiltonian means could be made to serve progressive ends, provided the right people were put in charge. In Croly's (1909) progressive manifesto, The Promise of American Life, Theodore Roosevelt personifi ed the kind of leader who, by dint of education, virtue, and social-mindedness, would ensure that the federal government's new powers were used wisely and scientifi cally.
21. Ely's two most infl uential protégés, John R. Commons and Edward A. Ross, were also strongly prowar, if not ultra-ists like Ely. See Gruber 1975. 7. Reviving Hamiltonism: Nationalism, Planning, and Progressive Taxation in World War I Progressives entertained different views of American entry into the war. Some opposed it. Jane Addams, for instance, worried that war would distract Americans from progressive causes, which were, in her view, entirely domestic. Robert La Follette thought that American entry into the war would enable the rich to profi teer. Theodore Roosevelt, on the other hand, beat the drums of war early on, and Richard T. Ely, by the summer of 1917, promised, as founder of the Madison chapter of the Wisconsin Loyalty Legion, "to stamp out disloyalty." Ely even denounced La Follette, his former ally and partner in the Wisconsin Idea, claiming that "La Follette has been of more help to the Kaiser than a quarter of a million troops" (cited in Gruber 1975, 207) . 21 But, once it was clear that President Wilson would be leading the United States into the European confl ict, progressives pro-and anti-war came to see that war mobilization offered a golden opportunity to promote nationalist feeling, and then to enlist it in the reform cause, against individualism and decentralization, and for technocracy and economic planning. John Dewey's 1918 essay, "The Social Possibilities of War," argued that World War I was instructing countries with "the individualistic tradition," on "the supremacy of public need over private possession" (Dewey 1929, 556) . The war, said Dewey, teaches us the virtues of using "social regulation for moral prophylaxis" (556), an allusion not just to the alcohol trade restrictions begun during war mobilization, but to the idea of social control more generally.
Dewey's view that war collectivism advanced progressive reform echoed his colleague Herbert Croly, who, in The Promise of American Life, had celebrated the Spanish-American War as the occasion that harnessed nationalism to progressivism. Said Croly (1909, 169) :
The Spanish War . . . and its resulting policy of extra-territorial expansion, so far from hindering the process of domestic amelioration, availed, from the sheer force of the national aspirations it aroused, to give a tremendous impulse to the work of national reform. By exploiting and promoting war patriotism during the Spanish-American War, Croly argued, progressivism gave reform its rightful national scope, reviving the "Hamiltonian ideal of constructive national legislation" (168).
And, fi nally, the First World War also proved to be a watershed for economic planning and graduated income taxation, two leading progressive desiderata. During U.S. involvement in World War I, the chief of the Central Bureau of Planning and Statistics of the War Industries Board (WIB) was the economist Edwin Gay, dean of the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration. The WIB introduced American citizens to the idea of economic planning and control in the service of government, and Gay and his colleagues seized the opportunity to put their business organizational ideas into government practice (Cuff 1989) .
The WIB was granted extensive planning powers in mobilizing for war, and it used them. The WIB coordinated most government purchasing, determined the allocation of resources, established priorities in output, fi xed prices on commodities in over sixty industries, not all of them military-related, and promoted improved accounting and other management practices (Fogel 2000) . When Grosvenor Clarkson, WIB member and historian, called the WIB an "industrial dictatorship," he exaggerated, but for the purposes of paying a compliment, namely, that the WIB established that "whole productive and distributive machinery of America could be directed successfully from Washington" (in McGerr 2003, 287, 285) . The mobilization effort, in Clarkson's characterization, was "a story of the conversion of one hundred million combatively individualistic people into a vast cooperative effort in which the good of the unit was sacrifi ced to the good of the whole." In appraising the advantages war provided to the reform movement, Clarkson volunteered that they "almost [make] war appear a blessing instead of a curse" (in McGerr 2003, 299) . 22 Though American involvement in the First World War was brief, a mere nineteen months, the WIB's success at war mobilization affi rmed the progressive faith in expertise, and its view that business planning methods could be applied by the government to the economy at large. While he granted that some war agencies would "melt away" at war's end, Dewey, for example, believed that the most important lesson, that a vast economy could be directed by Washington planners, could never be forgotten. The war, he believed, has "made it impossible for men to proceed any longer by ignoring the revolution which has taken place" (Dewey [1918 (Dewey [ ] 1929 .
The First World War also had the consequence of permanently establishing a long-standing reform goal, the graduated income tax. With large wartime expenditures and decreased tariff revenues from the wartime decline in international trade, the federal budget defi cit ballooned to unprecedented levels. The response, the Revenue Act of 1917, changed U.S. taxation history. It was, argues tax historian Elliot Brownlee (1990) , a watershed in the development of the welfare state. The Revenue Act raised federal income tax rates (recently made constitutional in 1913 with the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment), steeply increased income-tax progressivity (its top rate was 63 percent), expanded the income tax base, and taxed estates along with "excessive" war profi ts (Brownlee 1990 ). Federal government expenditures, under $1 billion before the war, jumped to $12.7 billion in 1918. In 1920, federal spending fell, but remained six times its prewar level.
Though born in the exigencies of wartime fi nance, the 1917 implementation of a more expansive and progressive income tax was not repealed with the end of the war. The Revenue Act of 1917 not only permanently established federal income taxes as a greater source of U.S. tax revenue than tariffs and excise taxes, it also presaged still greater expansions of the federal income-tax base and of its progressivity, most notably during another great national crisis, the Second World War (Brownlee 1990 ).
Progressivism and Eugenics
Because a belief in human hierarchy was necessary but not suffi cient for eugenics, we have investigated progressivism's other commitments to understand why so many progressives appealed to social control of human heredity when making the case for economic reform. Diffi cult though it is to appreciate in retrospect, eugenics in the Progressive Era was not aberrant, it was not pseudo-scientifi c, and its appeal was not limited to a particular political ideology nor confi ned to a particular country. Eugenic ideas, rather, were mainstream, were seen as socially minded, were embraced by nearly all geneticists, were appealed to by scholars and scientists of virtually every ideological stripe, and were infl uential in nearly all non-Catholic Western countries and in many others besides.
American economic reformers, for their part, were attracted to Progressive Era eugenics by the same intellectual commitments that drew them to economic and social reform more broadly-anti-individualism, effi ciency, scientifi c expertise, technocracy, organization, and planning. 23. Said Webb (1910-11, 237) , "No consistent eugenicist can be a 'Laisser Faire' individualist unless he throws up the game in despair. He must interfere, interfere, interfere!" First, anti-individualism. Progressive Era eugenics was a collectivist doctrine; it rejected individualism in favor of more aggregate units of explanation, the nation or race or class or stratum of intelligence. Eugenics better comported with the methodological holism of the progressives than did Darwinism, which allowed for selection at both the individual or group level. Where Darwinism accommodated competition among individuals within a group (species), eugenics, in practice, was nearly always premised on competition among groups.
Second, effi ciency via expertise. Progressive Era eugenics opposed laissez-faire values, by substituting an objective, expert determination of the social good for a subjective, individual determination of the social good. Individuals could not be relied upon to promote the social good of better heredity, but experts could. Eugenics promised to reform human heredity more effi ciently (and more humanely, eugenicists claimed) than could evolution by natural selection.
Third, science. There was, in the Progressive Era, an extraordinary vogue for evolutionary and other biological ideas applied to the sciences of society. American eugenic science, before the 1930s, was popular and respectable, and it possessed real scientifi c authority. As believers in the epistemic and moral authority of science, progressives adopted an almost religious attitude toward science, believing that Progressive Era biology could explain and control human inheritance.
Fourth, social control as state planning. Though eugenics can, in principle, comprise the free reproductive choices of individuals, in the Progressive Era, the term "eugenics" connoted the planned social control of human heredity. When Francis Galton's (1904) eugenicist manifesto spoke of the "agencies under social control," he meant the state. Indeed, the very idea of eugenics, the substitution of state selection for natural selection, was predicated upon the failure, or at least the relative ineffi ciency, of natural selection. Laissez-faire eugenics, as Sidney Webb boasted, was, in the Progressive Era, a contradiction in terms.
23
Commitment to anti-individualism, effi ciency, scientifi c expertise, technocracy, organization, and planning did not, of course, compel the support of eugenics. Not all American reformers endorsed eugenic ideas, even if the opponents of eugenics among them were scarce on the ground. And, moreover, many who did not share the progressive commitments embraced eugenics nonetheless. But the progressives' foundational intellectual beliefs did make eugenics and progressivism complementary rather than antagonistic trends in the Progressive Era (Searle 1998, 25-26) , and help to explain the embrace of eugenics by so many progressive economists and their reform allies.
Herbert Spencer, the bête noire of American economic reform, also had (arguably) hierarchical views, and he too offered a biological defense of his social and economic ideas. But Spencer, as a proponent of individualism and critic of expert-guided state compulsion, was no eugenicist. Spencer imagined human improvement as an exercise in Lamarckian self-help.
The progressives, in contrast, believed that the crooked timber of humanity could not straighten itself. The project of human improvement, once made part of the progressive project of social improvement, could no longer be left to the self-regarding, undirected, and ineffi cient choices of ordinary individuals. It would instead be entrusted to the socially minded, planned, and effi cient choice of scientifi c experts.
